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Problem area 
The aviation industry has identified 
the need for improvements to flight 
crew training to prevent Loss of 
Control – In Flight incidents and 
accidents.  
 
The International Committee for 
Aviation Training in Extended 
Envelopes (ICATEE) was 
established by the Royal 
Aeronautical Society to investigate 
the current training programmes 
and facilities and recommend 
improvements to aviation regulatory 
organisations such as ICAO, the 
FAA and EASA.  
 
One of the sub working groups of 
ICATEE is investigating simulator 
fidelity requirements in order to 
make simulator standards 
recommendations. This paper will 
describe the process of aligning the 
training objectives, identified by the 
ICATEE training group, with 
training devices in support of a 
comprehensive upset prevention 
and recovery training program. 
 
Description of work 
A Human Factors and Training 
analysis was carried out within the 
ICATEE working group by a group 
of experts from across the aviation 
industry. The analysis was based on 
the training tasks and objectives 
defined in the ICATEE upset 
prevention & recovery training 
matrix. 
 
Each training task was analysed by 
Human Factors experts for the cues 
that were critical to achieving the 
training objective. This analysis was 
then used to establish the required 
fidelity for simulator features.  
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Results and conclusions 
The analysis of the simulator 
features and associated fidelity level 
required defined the requirements  
for simulator devices. It was 
compared with existing devices 
defined in ICAO Document 9625.  
 
This comparison led to the 
identification of four supplemental 
device types, one of which was a 
modification of the existing ICAO 
Type VII device. 
 
The analysis of training tasks shows 
that the majority of the ICATEE 
training programme can be carried 
out using existing devices, and is 
enhanced by minor modifications to 
existing devices. The remaining 
tasks can be trained in a light 
aerobatic-capable aircraft.  
 
Applicability 
This paper applies to all flight 
simulation training devices that 
could be used for upset prevention 
& recovery training. 
 
The results of the paper can be used 
to inform the improvement of 
FSTDs to support Upset Prevention 
and Recovery Training (UPRT) 
programmes. The process that is 
described in this paper can further 
be applied to the analysis of 
simulator requirements for other 
additional training tasks. 
 
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
 
  
   
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2013-410 
 
Simulator fidelity requirements for upset 
prevention & recovery training 
  
J.N. Field and D.A. Shikany1 
 
1 The Boeing Company 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report is based on a presentation held at the Royal Aeronautical Society Flight Crew Training Conference, 
London, September 25 & 26, 2013. 
The contents of this report may be cited on condition that full credit is given to NLR and the authors. 
This publication has been refereed by the Advisory Committee AIR TRANSPORT. 
Customer RAeS 
Contract number - - -  
Owner NLR + partner(s) 
Division NLR Air Transport 
Distribution Unlimited 
Classification of title Unclassified 
 November 2013 
Approved by: 
Author 
J.N. Field 
 
 
 
Reviewer 
Z.C. Roza 
 
 
 
Managing department 
H. Bohnen 
 
 
 
Date:  Date:  Date:  
  
NLR-TP-2013-410 
  
 2 
 
Summary 
This paper will describe the process of aligning the training objectives, identified by the 
ICATEE training group, with training devices in support of a comprehensive upset prevention 
and recovery training program. It will summarize the training device feature fidelity analysis 
used to determine the required device for a given training task. The paper will identify existing 
devices, enhancements required to existing devices or new devices needed to meet all of the 
training tasks contained in the matrix. 
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Abbreviations 
AoA = Angle of attack 
ATC = Air Traffic Control 
FTD = Flight Training Device 
FFS =  Full Flight Simulator 
FSTD = Flight Simulator Training Device 
GAD = G-Awareness Device 
ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ICATEE = International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes 
IOS = Instructor Operating Station 
LOC-I =  Loss of Control In-flight 
R & T = Research and Technology 
SPD = Spin Training Device 
SDD = Spatial Disorientation Device 
UPRT = Upset Prevention and Recovery Training 
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1 Introduction 
The International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes, ICATEE, is an 
initiative of the Royal Aeronautical Society aimed at bringing together the world’s flight 
training and simulation technology experts to develop guidelines for Upset Prevention and 
Recovery Training (UPRT). The main goal of the group is to address Loss-of-Control In-flight 
(LOC-I) accidents, which currently are the leading cause of fatalities in the worldwide 
commercial jet fleet. ICATEE believes that an integrated approach is needed to learn how to 
prevent and recover from an upset.  Such an approach combines knowledge (academics), 
simulators, and actual aeroplane training.  Defining what, and how much, training should go 
into each approach has been the subject of much debate. This paper describes the process of 
determining the technical requirements for UPRT that are driven by the training needs defined 
by the ICATEE training group. This process led to the establishment of Flight Simulation 
Training Device (FSTD) standards for UPRT, as well as the definition of fidelity requirements 
for the training tasks in the UPRT programme.  
 
 
2 Background & Method 
The matrix of training tasks for UPRT that was developed by the ICATEE training 
subcommittee forms the basis for the training device requirements analysis. The training matrix 
identifies 176 training tasks for a comprehensive UPRT training programme. These tasks are 
identified for three mitigation levels: 
• Awareness - knowledge and skills necessary to provide pilots with an appreciation of 
the concepts, principles, techniques, and procedures that can be valuable in 
understanding upset hazards, assessing risk, and employing recovery strategies 
• Prevention - information specific to recognizing and avoiding the hazards associated 
with unexpected aeroplane upsets and in-flight loss-of-control events 
• Recovery - knowledge, skills, techniques, and procedures required to return an 
aeroplane to safe flight 
 
Each training task, or element, is identified alongside a learning objective for the task. The 
learning objective along with the requirement for practical training formed the basis for the 
fidelity analysis.    
 
The example below (Table 1) is an excerpt from the Awareness mitigation level of the training 
matrix and illustrates some of the key components of the matrix. 
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Table 1  Training Matrix Excerpt 
Training Element 
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y 
High AOA 
Performance 
Consideration X X FT
D
 Understanding of the relationship between 
high Angle of Attack (AoA) and increased 
induced drag 
 
 
T YES 
High Altitude Stall 
X X FF
S 
Demonstration of stall recoveries, altitude 
loss, recovery with reduced thrust/power and 
other performance differences associated with 
high altitude flight 
 
 
T YES 
Pitot-Static 
System Failure 
 
X   
Depiction of actual instrument indications of 
various pitot-static system failure modes 
 
 
T YES 
All Attitude 
Exposure 
 X A 
Exposure to 360° of roll and pitch attitudes 
required to gain appreciation for attitudes from 
which recovery may be required 
Required 
psychological 
exposure 
cannot be 
provided 
through 
simulation 
T YES 
 
The fidelity analysis focused on the training elements that included a practical requirement (the 
3rd column in the table above).  Those tasks identified as purely academic were not included. So 
in the above example the third task (Pitot-Static System Failure), which is academic and not 
practical, did not require a fidelity analysis.  The learning objective provided the key objective 
of the training element, and could be used to identify the level of fidelity that was required for 
the practical training environment. Also, the remarks section often included comments intended 
to assist in the interpretation of the learning objective. Early versions of the training matrix 
included an initial assessment of the required training device for the practical training by the 
training subcommittee members (4th column in the example above). While this was not directly 
used in the fidelity analysis, it did serve as a useful check once the device requirements and 
resulting training device had been identified.   
 
 
                                                     
1 A – Aircraft; FFS – Full Flight Simulator; FTD – Flight Training Device 
2 T – Training; TP – Training to Proficiency 
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3 Analysis 
For each step of this analysis, the method used was an assessment of the training tasks by 
experts in their field from the ICATEE group. For example, the cue analysis was carried out by 
Human Factors experts, and reviewed by representatives from training, simulation, and flight 
crew. Likewise, the FSTD feature fidelity analysis was carried out by a team of simulation & 
training experts, and reviewed by other members of the ICATEE group. Initial experiments 
have been carried out and are still being analysed to test some of the fidelity assessments.  
 
3.1 Cue analysis  
The cue analysis was the starting point for the assessment of the training device requirements. 
Taking each training task where practical training was expected, the required fidelity for the 
(simulated) cues to support this training was identified. Five categories were used for each 
training task: Control Forces, Instruments, Visual, Motion and Aural. For each category, an 
assessment was carried out as to whether this cue was required for the training objective, and if 
so, it was rated as: 
- Physiological effects (p) 
- Alerting or Awareness (a) 
- Control (of the aircraft) (c) 
If a cue was not required, it was marked as such (not required - n). For each cue, the assessment 
was carried out for its specific relevance to the learning objective identified by the training 
group. The assessment was carried out by a subgroup of aviation Human Factors experts and 
reviewed by both the training and technology groups.  
 
The five categories were considered as separate cues – Control Forces relates to the pilots haptic 
interface via the aircraft controls; Instruments relates to the information exchange with the 
aircraft via the instruments; Visual, Motion and Aural relates to the cues that are received via 
the senses that relate to the control (for example, visual or motion feedback of a control input), 
or alerting & awareness (for example, an aural warning). The physiological effects were 
identified where the physiological effects of a cue (for example, g-cueing, or spatial 
disorientation) play a critical role in the learning objective. This process is illustrated by the 
examples in Table 2, below. 
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Table 2  Examples of Cue Requirements 
Training 
Element 
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Learning Objective Remarks 
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High AOA 
Performance 
Consideration X X FT
D
 
c/
a a n a a 
Understanding of the 
relationship between 
high AoA and increased 
induced drag 
 
T YES 
High Altitude 
Stall 
X X FF
S 
c/
a a n a a 
Demonstration of stall 
recoveries, altitude loss, 
recovery with reduced 
thrust/power and other 
performance differences 
associated with high 
altitude flight 
 
T YES 
Pitot-Static 
System Failure 
 X  FT
D
 
c a n n a 
Depiction of actual 
instrument indications of 
various pitot-static 
system failure modes 
 
T YES 
All Attitude 
Exposure 
 X A
 c a a p/
c a 
Exposure to 360° of roll 
and pitch attitudes 
required to gain 
appreciation for attitudes 
from which recovery 
may be required 
Required 
psychological 
exposure 
cannot be 
provided 
through 
simulation 
T YES 
Cues: a – alerting/awareness; p – physiological; c - control 
 
For the High Angle of Attack (AoA) Performance Consideration, and for the High Altitude 
Stall, the Control Forces were rated as required for both control and an awareness cue for the 
pilots. This was considered in terms of being able to achieve the learning objective. For 
example, to be able to demonstrate stall recoveries at high altitude, the force feedback from the 
controls is a key element in the skills learning for the pilots. The instrument feedback to the 
crew is required for both alerting and awareness cues. When considering the Visual, Motion and 
Aural aspects of these manoeuvres, both Motion and Aural were deemed necessary as part of 
the awareness cues, but Visual cues were not required. 
 
For the Pitot-Static System Failure task, the control forces are required as part of the pilot’s 
control task in responding to the failure, but do not represent an element of the alerting or 
awareness cues. In addition, this task was not considered as requiring motion cues in order to 
achieve the learning objective (which is also reflected in the initial estimate of an FTD device 
shown in the example table). Since it was considered an Academic only task at the Awareness 
mitigation level, the analysis was not applied further.  
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The All Attitude Exposure training task is included to illustrate the consideration of the 
physiological cues that may be required to achieve the learning objectives. For the All Attitude 
Exposure task, the motion cues were identified as contributing to both the physiological, and 
control cues of the flight crew. The physiological effects of the motion cue contribute to the 
pilot’s orientation to motion cues associated with upsets and stalls. In severe cases, the motion 
may also have an impact on the control cues (and forces) for the pilot.  
 
The aim of the cue analysis was to rate each training task, and so to be able to identify the cues 
that were critical to the achievement of the learning objective. This rating would then guide the 
assessment of the current training facilities (such as Level D FSTDs) and help to identify any 
shortcomings in these facilities. Furthermore, the cue assessment would guide the analysis of 
how a specific simulator feature fidelity would need to be improved – for example, improving 
the flight model to support the control forces and instrument cues for the pilots. 
 
3.2 Feature fidelity analysis 
The framework for device features in the 3rd edition of the Manual of Criteria for the 
Qualification of Flight Simulation Training Devices (ICAO, 2009) formed the basis of the 
training device requirements analysis and specification. The analysis that was carried out by the 
ICATEE R&T team aligned the training objectives from the training matrix with the training 
device capabilities. This included current training device capabilities, and, where required, 
specifying new capabilities to satisfy the training objective. The results of this analysis are 
expected to be incorporated in the next release of ICAO Document 9625. 
 
On the basis of the fidelity analysis, each of the training tasks was then assessed in terms of the 
thirteen simulator features from ICAO Document 9625: 
- Cockpit layout and structure 
- Flight Model (aero and engine) 
- Ground Handling 
- Aircraft Systems 
- Flight Controls and Forces 
- Sound cue 
- Visual cue 
- Motion cue 
- Environment – Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
- Environment – Weather 
- Environment – Aerodromes and terrain 
- Miscellaneous (includes Instructor Operating Station) 
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The device features that were applicable to the training task were checked against the device 
feature fidelity requirements identified in ICAO Document 9625: Not required (N), Generic (G), 
Representative (R), and Specific (S).    
 
Additional ratings were identified for the features where the existing ICAO 9625 requirements 
(e.g. Representative, or Specific) did not contain sufficient fidelity, or did not meet the training 
objective requirements. The following example (Table 3) shows the feature fidelity analysis for 
three of the tasks used in the earlier example. 
 
For the High AOA Performance Considerations task, a check of the existing feature fidelity 
requirements indicate that the training objective could be met by the “representative” fidelity 
level for the device features of importance to this task. This results in an “R” designation for 
these features in the example below (e.g. Flight Model, Aeroplane Systems, Flight Controls & 
Forces, etc.). 
 
For the High Altitude Stall task, some features required additional fidelity beyond the existing 
requirements.  For the Flight Model the current requirements call for the model to account for 
various effects “normally encountered in flight”. This was interpreted to cover the portion of the 
flight envelope up to the angle of attack for the first indication of stall. To cover the full stall 
and recovery portions, additional requirements for the flight model were needed leading to a 
designation of “S1” for that feature’s fidelity level. Improvements to the IOS were needed to 
provide the instructor with greater visibility of pilot control inputs and provide feedback on 
whether the training had exceeded the limitations of the simulator. This led to the “S1” fidelity 
designation for the Miscellaneous – IOS feature.  Lastly this task required enhancements to the 
motion cues (buffet) to support the training objective. This led to the R2 designation for motion 
cues (R1 is already used in the 3rd Edition of the ICAO 9625 document). The details of these 
additional fidelity designations (e.g. S1, R2, R3, etc.) are included in the Part B Simulator 
Standards of the ICATEE Research & Technology report (RAeS, to be published). 
 
Since the Pitot-Static System Failure task was identified as an Academic only training task (for 
the Awareness training), there was no further consideration of the simulator feature fidelity 
requirements for this task. 
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Table 3  Examples of FSTD Feature Fidelity Requirements  
Training Element 
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Learning Objective 
High AOA 
Performance 
Considerations X X FT
D
 
R
 
R
 
N
 
R
 
R
 
R
 
R
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Understanding of the 
relationship between high 
AoA and increased induced 
drag 
High Altitude Stall 
X X FF
S S S
1 N
 
S S R
 
R
 
R
2 N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
S
1 
Demonstration of stall 
recoveries, altitude loss, 
recovery with reduced 
thrust/power and other 
performance differences 
associated with high altitude 
flight 
Pitot-Static System 
Failure 
 X   
             Depiction of actual 
instrument indications of 
various pitot-static system 
failure modes 
All Attitude Exposure 
 X A S S N
 
S S R
 
R
 
R
2 N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
S
1 
Exposure to 360° of roll and 
pitch attitudes required to 
gain appreciation for 
attitudes from which recovery 
may be required 
Fidelity: N – not required; G – generic; R – representative; S – specific 
 
When the feature fidelity assessment was complete for all of the tasks in the matrix, 
enhancements were also required to the Flight Controls and Forces, Visual Cues and 
Environment – Weather features. 
 
 
4 Rollup  
4.1 Devices – rollup results 
Having identified the FSTD feature fidelity requirements for each of the 176 training tasks, the 
individual ratings were combined.  This resulted in nearly 40 unique feature fidelity 
combinations.  Some of these combinations aligned to FSTD types currently identified in the 
ICAO 9625 document that could satisfy the training task.  The remaining combinations were 
grouped by fidelity levels for key simulation features.  This was done to minimize the number 
of new device types and not negate the efforts of the 3rd Edition of the ICAO 9625 document 
by significantly increasing the number of devices.  The alignment of feature fidelity 
requirements to training devices was based on judgment.  No alternative exists, as experiments 
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have not yet been performed to guide the required capabilities.  As such, conservatism was 
applied out of an abundance of caution.  Appendix A2 of the ICATEE Research and 
Technology Report (RAeS, to be published) contains the results of the entire analysis. This 
Appendix would allow a device to be qualified for a specific training task, similar to Part III of 
the 3rd edition of the ICAO 9625 document. 
 
The following example (Table 4) shows the fidelity analysis for three of the tasks used in the 
earlier example.  The fourth column has been added to the table that identifies the minimum 
device type required to support the training task based on the process described in the previous 
paragraph.  For the High AOA Performance Considerations task the training objective could be 
met by the existing Type III device. 
 
For the High Altitude Stall task, some features required additional fidelity beyond the existing 
requirements resulting in a Type VII+ device.   
 
Table 4  Example of Training Device Alignment 
Training Element 
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Learning Objective 
High AOA 
Performance 
Consideration X X FT
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R
 
R
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R
 
R
 
R
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N
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Understanding of the 
relationship between high 
AoA and increased induced 
drag 
High Altitude Stall 
X X FF
S 
V
II+
 
S S
1 N
 
S S R
 
R
 
R
2 N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
S
1 
Demonstration of stall 
recoveries, altitude loss, 
recovery with reduced 
thrust/power and other 
performance differences 
associated with high altitude 
flight 
Pitot-Static System 
Failure 
 X   
              Depiction of actual 
instrument indications of 
various pitot-static system 
failure modes 
All Attitude Exposure 
 X A A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Exposure to 360° of roll and 
pitch attitudes required to 
gain appreciation for 
attitudes from which recovery 
may be required 
Fidelity: N – not required; G – generic; R – representative; S – specific; A - Aircraft 
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A complete analysis of the training matrix shows that a number of UPRT tasks could be met 
with the existing Type III, V or VII devices. However, some tasks require simulator feature 
fidelities greater than (ICAO, 2009) Type VII FSTDs, or capabilities differing from ICAO-
approved devices. Similar to the High Altitude Stall task example above, some tasks are likely 
to require a higher fidelity flight model, improved motion cuing, or the ability to generate 
sustained G forces. In these cases, ICATEE defined five (5) supplemental training devices 
required to meet all of the tasks contained in the ICATEE UPRT matrix. Fidelity requirements 
for these devices are briefly summarized as follows: 
• Type VII+ Training Devices are not new devices per se but result from upgrading 
existing Type VII devices. Additional requirements were defined to enhance the 
following features: 
> flight models 
> flight control responses and control forces 
> motion cuing 
> environmental/weather capabilities 
> instructor operating stations 
• Type GAD - G-Awareness Devices are capable of generating sustained load factors to 
support G-awareness training. 
• Type SPD - Spin Training Devices constitute an upgrade of the Type VII FSTD 
beyond that required for a Type VII+ device, should spin training become a requirement 
and simulators be used for that purpose. These devices replicate the rapid attitude 
changes and sustained G forces experienced in a spin manoeuvre and are characterized 
by a flight model more sophisticated than those of Type VII+ devices. 
• Type SDD - Spatial Disorientation Training Devices support tasks where enhanced 
visual and motion cues and sensations cannot be replicated readily in a flight simulation 
training device. 
• On-Aeroplane Training is required for tasks where physiological and psychological 
effects can be experienced only in an all-attitude/all-envelope environment that cannot 
be replicated using current simulator technology. The ICATEE Training group also 
identified tasks that would initially be trained on an aircraft, but for recurrent training 
would be performed in a FSTD.  These tasks have their device noted as an A* in the 
training matrix. 
 
A summary of the existing and new FSTDs is presented in the matrix below (Table 5). 
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Table 5  FSTD Summary Matrix 
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SDD G G N G G G R2 R4 G S G G  
N
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SPD S S2 S S S R S R3 N S R R S1 
GAD G R N G R G R2 R3 N N N N S1 
VII+ S S1 S S S1 R S R2 N S R2 R S1 
VII S S S S S R S R S S R R  
E
xi
st
in
g 
de
vi
ce
s 
VII S S S S S R S R N S R R  
VI R R R R R R S R1 S S R R  
V S S S S S R R N G S R R  
IV R G G R G R G N G S G R  
III R R R R R G R N N S G G  
II G G G R G G G N G S G G  
I R R R R R G R N N S G G(S)  
I R R R R R1 G G N N S G G  
I R R R R R G R N N S G R(S)  
Fidelity: N – not required; G – generic; R – representative; S – specific 
 
It should be reiterated that the VII+ device requirements could readily be merged with the 
existing Type VII requirements.  However due to questions of whether the requirements are 
retroactive, or if full stall recovery training is mandated, it was decided to keep them separate 
for this initial analysis.  Detailed fidelity requirements for the above devices are defined in Part 
B of the ICATEE R&T document (RAeS, to be published) for each of the simulation devices 
and will be discussed in greater detail in another paper presented at this conference. For the 
Type VII+ device, the requirements have been defined to include objective as well as function 
and subjective test requirements. It is expected that tasks assigned to GADs and SPDs will 
initially be completed in a training aeroplane and transferred to a flight simulation device in the 
future. Devices equivalent to the Types SDD and GAD currently exist and may suffice 
depending on the results of requirement formulation. 
 
Each task in the training matrix was eventually assigned to one of nine training devices required 
for its delivery: None (Academic Only); ICAO Type III, V, and VII FSTDs; Device Types 
VII+, GAD, SPD, and SDD; and aeroplane.  Table 6 provides the distribution of the 176 UPRT 
tasks defined in the training matrix across the mitigation levels and device types. 
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Table 6 Training Tasks Distributed by Device Types 
Device Awareness Prevention Recovery Total Tasks % Total Tasks 
Training Tasks that Use Existing ICAO-Approved Simulation Devices 
None (Academic only) 8 13 33 54 30.7% 
Type III 2 0 4 6 3.4% 
Type V 1 5 2 8 4.5% 
Type VII 1 11 19 31 17.6% 
Subtotals 12 29 58 99 56.3% 
Training Tasks that Use Non-Existent or Non-ICAO Approved Simulation Devices 
Upgraded Type VII+ 7 22 17 46 26.1% 
Spin Training Device 3 2 3 8 4.5% 
G Awareness Device 4 3 3 10 5.7% 
Spatial Disorient. Device 0 1 1 2 1.1% 
Aeroplane 3 2 6 11 6.3% 
Subtotals 17 30 30 77 43.7% 
Summary 
Task Totals 29 59 88 176 100.0 
 
Table 6 reveals that 99 of 176 training task (56%) can be performed using existing ICAO-
approved technology. Fifty-four of these 99 tasks (31%) involve ground-based academic 
training not requiring a device. While 45 of the 99 tasks (25%) can be performed in a Type III, 
V, or VII FSTD, with 31 tasks (18%) requiring a Type VII device. 
 
The remaining 77 tasks (44%) in the training matrix require an upgrade of, or addition to, a 
currently approved ICAO device. Spin, G-awareness, spatial disorientation, and on-aeroplane 
training together account for 31 tasks (18%) of the 77. Moreover, all of these 31 tasks, except 2 
spatial disorientation-training tasks (1%), can reliably be delivered in light aeroplanes. 
However, the 46 remaining tasks (26%) require a Type VII+ device.   
 
In summary, over 3/4 of 176 tasks in the training matrix can be accomplished with today’s 
devices or today’s devices with some modest improvements. The data in column six of Table 6 
are displayed graphically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1  Distribution of UPRT Tasks by Device Type 
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5 What’s next 
The feature fidelity analysis carried out by this ICATEE team has been used to define the Part B 
simulator standards section of the ICATEE R&T report (RAeS, to be published). This Part B 
has, in turn, been provided to ICAO, the FAA and EASA to inform the ongoing work to 
establish simulator standards to support UPRT. It is expected that portions of Part B will be the 
basis for a future update of the ICAO Document 9625 providing guidance on the FSTD fidelity 
requirements for UPRT programmes. 
 
The feature fidelity requirements and subsequent training device alignment described above 
were driven by the training needs.  For this effort, those training needs were captured in the 
training matrix developed by the ICATEE training group.  If the training objectives change due 
to new regulatory requirements or the introduction of new aircraft technology, the technical 
requirements will need to be reviewed.   
 
One area where regulations are currently being defined is related to stall training. 
Approximately 50 of the 176 training tasks in the ICATEE training matrix are related to stall. 
This is largely in response to the passage of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension Act of 2010. This U.S. law requires stall and upset recognition and 
recovery training (Public Law 111-216, 2010). What if the training objectives were limited to 
approach to stall instead of full stall? An initial assessment of the training matrix shows that this 
would essentially eliminate the need for the Type SPD (Spin Training Device) and significantly 
reduce the number of tasks performed on an aircraft.  The number of tasks requiring a Type 
VII+ device would also be reduced by roughly two-thirds; but not eliminated. This is an 
example of how the technical requirements for FSTDs are driven by training needs; and as the 
training needs change, the technical requirements must follow.  
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6 Summary 
This paper has traced the definition of training devices to support a comprehensive UPRT 
program, including recovery from full stalls.  Based on the tasks and objectives contained in the 
ICATEE training matrix, cueing and FSTD feature fidelity requirements were determined to 
support a given training task. Each task was then aligned to an existing FSTD device or a new 
device.  One of the 5 new devices identified is a Type VII+ device.  This device represents some 
modest enhancements to today’s highest level of FSTD (Type VII).  Over ¾ of the tasks 
contained in the training matrix can be accomplished in existing devices or the VII+ device. It is 
expected that the Type VII+ requirements will eventually be combined with the existing Type 
VII device requirements in future revisions of regulatory material. 
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